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Comparing Policies to Combat Emissions Leakage: 
Border Tax Adjustments versus Rebates 
Carolyn Fischer and Alan K. Fox 
Abstract 
We explore conditions determining which anti-leakage policies might be more effective 
complements to domestic greenhouse gas emissions regulation. We consider four policies that could be 
combined with unilateral emissions pricing to counter effects on international competitiveness: a border 
tax on imports, a border rebate for exports, full border adjustment, and a domestic production rebate (as 
might be implemented with output-based allocation of emissions allowances). Each option faces different 
potential legal hurdles in international trade law; each also has different economic impacts. While all have 
the potential to support domestic production, none is necessarily effective at reducing global emissions. 
Nor is it possible to rank order the options. In each case, the effectiveness depends on the relative 
emissions rates, elasticities of substitution, and consumption volumes. We illustrate these results with 
simulations for the energy-intensive sectors of two different economies, the United States and Canada.  
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Comparing Policies to Combat Emissions Leakage:  
Border Tax Adjustments versus Rebates 
Carolyn Fischer and Alan K. Fox ∗ 
Introduction 
A major stumbling block toward adopting significant policies for reducing greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions has been concern over the lack of emissions pricing on the part of key 
trade partners. If emissions regulation raises prices for domestic producers, the loss of 
competitive advantage would lead to the displacement of production and thereby emissions 
abroad. Currently, the United States, Japan, and the European Union are significant net importers 
of embodied CO2 emissions, while China and India are significant net exporters (Peters and 
Hertwich, forthcoming), and fears are mounting that unilateral carbon pricing will exacerbate 
this situation. As a consequence, interest has been growing in policies that have the potential to 
combat leakage. 
A popular option is border adjustment, which typically implies requiring importers to pay 
a tax according to the emissions associated with their product’s production, at the same price as 
faced by domestic producers. This idea has support in the U.S. electricity industry (Morris and 
Hill 2007). For example, the Lieberman/Warner bill (S. 2191 “America’s Climate Security Act”) 
incorporates a requirement for purchasing “international reserve allowances” to cover goods 
imported from countries that have not undertaken adequate steps to mitigate GHG emissions 
(Section 1311). The allowance requirement is based on the national (foreign) energy intensity of 
production in that sector, but is reduced by the share of emissions for which the domestic U.S. 
sector receives free allocation of allowances. The Bingaman/Specter bill (S. 1766 “Low Carbon 
Economy Act”) includes a weak form of border adjustment by requiring importers to have 
emissions permits when the emissions in the unregulated (or underregulated) producing country 
sector increase above a baseline level. The idea of border adjustment of carbon pricing is also 
gaining ground in Europe (e.g., Godard 2007; Grubb and Neuhoff 2006), as the European Union 
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is preparing the next phase of the Emissions Trading System (ETS) and considering options in 
the absence of a major international agreement to cap GHG emissions. Karp and Zhao (2008) 
argue that trade measures against carbon leakage could help support a new multilateral climate 
agreement. 
However, many trade law experts have concerns that such trade measures may not be 
compatible with World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations, and we review these arguments 
in the next section. Others voice apprehensions that unilateral trade measures could poison future 
climate negotiations (Houser et al. 2008). The U.S. International Trade Representative has 
expressed worries that such measures could harm trade relations (ICTSD 2008) and has vowed to 
resist any E.U. attempt to impose climate taxes on U.S. products. Concerns for international 
relations notwithstanding, fewer people have challenged the notion that import charges would, if 
allowed, be appropriate and effective at combating leakage and enhancing global emissions 
reductions.  
Conceptually, however, there are several unilateral policy options for dealing with the 
relative price changes that cause leakage. Import taxes level the playing field for domestic 
consumption, but do nothing abroad. Border rebates for exports keep the playing field level 
abroad, but still give imports a competitive advantage at home. Full border adjustment policies 
combine these two measures, such that only the emissions from domestic consumption are taxed 
(with an analogy to the way in which value-added taxes are implemented).  
A final option is to mitigate the impacts of emissions regulation on domestic production 
costs by offering rebates to all domestic production, not just exports; we will refer to this type of 
policy as the “home rebate.” Such a policy could equivalently be implemented by using rate-
based mechanisms for regulation or emissions permit allocation (e.g., tradable performance 
standards or output-based allocation with updating; Fischer 2001). The Lieberman/Warner bill 
variants have incorporated similar mechanisms by allocating emissions allowances among firms 
in energy-intensive sectors in proportion to their employment or according to electricity use. The 
Inslee/Doyle bill (“Carbon Leakage Prevention Act”) proposes to distribute emissions 
allowances among certain trade-sensitive sectors according to output, multiplied by a sector-
based emissions factor. The home rebate keeps the playing field level at home and abroad, but at 
the expense of opportunities to reduce emissions by reducing consumption.  
Indeed, while all these policies have the potential to mitigate leakage, as conventionally 
defined, it is not clear that they would necessarily enhance the environmental integrity of climate 
policies from a global perspective. This paper explores the conditions that determine which anti-
leakage policies are the most effective complements to domestic GHG emissions regulation. It 
reveals that while all these policies help to protect domestic production, none of them necessarily Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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reduces global emissions. Nor is it possible to rank order the options. In each case, the 
effectiveness depends on the relative emissions rates, elasticities of substitution, and 
consumption volumes. The subsequent numerical analysis compares the effectiveness of the 
different policies for different kinds of sectors and economies, using the United States and 
Canada as examples. The simulations show that the largest share of leakage may arise from the 
effects of climate policies on energy prices, and while adjustment policies can mitigate leakage 
on the margin, they are quite limited in terms of reducing global emissions. 
Background 
In a provocative article, Stiglitz (2006) has argued that not pricing the global external 
costs of carbon emissions is a de facto domestic subsidy that should allow for countervailing 
duties. While this argument may make economic sense, global trade law is unlikely to accept that 
the absence of regulation would be an actionable subsidy under the agreement governing 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) (see, e.g., Bagwati and Mavroidis 2007; Green 
2006). Still, no clear opinion exists on the use of trade measures to support the integrity of 
climate policies, as they have neither been explicitly negotiated nor tested in the dispute 
settlement process.  
The Stiglitz argument is an extension of the “polluter pays principle” by which the 
efficient allocation of resources in the long run is achieved by ensuring that the polluting party 
bears the economic burden of the environmental costs. In the case of a transboundary pollutant 
like GHGs, those parties may lie in other countries. Fischer et al. (2004) note that this principle is 
not the only fundamental of environmental economics that the legal institutions for international 
trade do not formally recognize. A second overlooked principle is the economic equivalence of 
emissions tax and permit regimes. Both introduce an emissions price as a market mechanism for 
incentivizing pollution reduction; however, one is a tax while the other is a regulation, and they 
have different legal implications. 
As a result, for global pollution problems, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) may create some barriers to implementing economically justified policies to prevent 
emissions leakage from more stringently regulated countries. On the other hand, if that is so, 
some design options might pass legal muster.  
Legal Analysis of Border Adjustment 
There are several good reviews of the compatibility of GATT/WTO law with climate 
policy in general and border adjustment options in particular. Pauwelyn (2007), Brewer (2008), Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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Biermann and Brohm (2005), Kommerskollegium (2004), Zhang and Assunção (2001), Sampson 
(1998), and Esty (1994) take a primarily legal view. Hoerner and Muller (1997), Fischer et al. 
(2004), and Ismer and Neuhoff (2004) add an economic perspective. de Cendra (2006) and van 
Asselt and Biermann (2007) focus on options for incorporating border adjustment into the E.U. 
ETS in a manner that could be WTO compatible.  
The law on border tax adjustment has evolved with major consumption taxes in mind. 
For example, governments include imports in and exempt exported goods from indirect taxes, 
such as a value-added tax or sales tax, which are designed to be paid by consumers in the country 
of destination. The GATT permits adjustment at the border for indirect taxes on “like” products, 
but not for direct taxes, such as income tax or emissions tax, which are imposed on factors of 
production in the country of origin. The issue becomes murkier when looking at taxes on 
products used in the production process. Furthermore, different aspects of GATT law govern the 
border adjustability of imports versus exports. 
Regarding export rebates, the GATT SCM initially specified that taxes on inputs to 
production are border adjustable only when the goods are “physically incorporated” into the 
exported products. A revision in the Uruguay Round broadened the category of adjustable taxes 
to allow export rebates for indirect taxes on goods and services if they are “consumed” in the 
production of the exported product: in addition to physically incorporated inputs, export rebates 
are permitted on energy, fuels, and oil used in the production process (SCM, Annex II, footnote 
61). Thus, for example, a gasoline tax that may have environmental purposes would be 
adjustable, because energy is a qualifying material input in the exported products. But an 
environmental tax on noxious emissions would not be adjustable because pollution is a 
“disincorporated material output.” However, for policies concerning energy or GHG emissions, 
it is still unclear whether specific taxes on energy are adjustable, and if so, whether adjustments 
may only be applied to exports and not to imports.  
For import adjustments, two key principles are important. First, the National Treatment 
principle embedded in Article III of the GATT requires that imported goods be treated no less 
favorably than “like” domestic products. Second, Most Favored Nation Treatment prohibits 
WTO members from discriminating among trading partners. These obligations may constrain 
what level of border adjustment might be allowed. One challenge is calculating the carbon 
content of imports in a way that does not discriminate against them. Some scholars interpret the 
trade rules to imply that the tax burden on imports may not be heavier than that on like domestic 
products (Kommerskollegium 2004). Thus, without clear and comparable metrics, it may be 
difficult to require payments for actual embodied emissions if they exceed the payments made 
for like domestic products. Pauwelyn (2007) proposes the option of using the emissions Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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associated with the predominant method of production in the United States. Alternatively, one 
might use a benchmark of the best available technology (BAT); Pauwelyn (2007), Godard 
(2007), and Ismer and Neuhoff (2004) argue that this metric is likely to be allowed, but it is a 
weaker adjustment factor and would therefore be less effective. Indeed, from an economic 
perspective, one would want to discriminate against more emissions-intensive imports. 
Even if they were ruled to be discriminatory, an argument could be made for justifying 
border adjustments on imports under Article XX, the general exceptions clause 
(Kommerskollegium 2004; Pauwelyn 2007; Sampson 1998). Three exceptions in that clause may 
be relevant for building that case: “(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
… (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement . . . ; (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption.” The latter exception may be particularly relevant for energy 
products and for the climate. Still, acceptance of such arguments is not assured; furthermore, this 
analysis reveals that the validity of the assertion that border adjustments contribute to the 
conservation of the climate is not assured. 
A further complication regards the method of adjustment; while economists would note 
that an allowance requirement for imports has similar effects to a tariff, the law is likely to make 
a distinction. Pauwelyn (2007) argues that an expansion of the law to allow for border 
adjustability for carbon taxes does not necessarily imply that regulations are adjustable: “Indeed, 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures only allows adjustment upon 
exportation (i.e. rebates) for taxes or duties, not for regulations” (27). Thus, it may be difficult to 
use a tax to adjust a cap-and-trade system at the border, particularly for rebates. However, one 
might still be able to extend carbon regulation to imports. Some case law indicates that if the 
regulations are deemed to be sufficiently product-related, an argument for comparable 
requirements for imports could be made. Morris and Hill (2007) make a similar point, that while 
a border adjustment tax would likely not be WTO compatible, an emissions permit requirement 
for imports should be. Brewer (2008) concurs that an emissions permit purchase requirement for 
imports is more likely to qualify as an environmental regulation allowable under the Article 
XX(g) exception. 
Another challenge is permit allocation. de Cendra (2006) and Hepburn et al. (2006) argue 
that auctioning may be a prerequisite for border adjustment, since the free allocation of permits 
through grandfathering might then appear to be an unfair subsidy. Similarly, Pauwelyn (2007) 
points out that adjustment taxes on imports would likely have to be reduced in proportion to the 
free allocation of emissions permits to comparable sectors in the United States. These legal Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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arguments run counter to the fact that grandfathering permits has little economic incentive effect, 
being a transfer. 
Output-based allocations, on the other hand, function as a rebate (or subsidy) to 
production, which does have incentive effects. An open question is whether such rebates or 
allocations would raise SCM issues. Again, it might be difficult to combine product-specific tax 
rebates with a cap-and-trade system, but permit allocations embedded in a domestic climate 
regulation are unlikely to raise eyebrows, unless significant overallocations are perceived. In the 
European Union, however, rebates and allocations would also have to navigate State Aid rules 
that are more stringent than those in the WTO. 
Most of the restrictions that multilateral trade agreements pose for market-based climate 
policies remain speculative at this point. As Fischer et al. (2004) summarize, a confluence of 
several events must occur for these speculations even to be tested. Emissions taxes and tradable 
permit systems must be sufficiently widespread and/or stringent as to have significant effects on 
export industries for offsetting policies to be called for. For those aspects of climate policy to be 
challenged under the GATT, a member country must show not only inconsistency with some 
rule but also harm from the resulting trade impacts. Furthermore, to prove that the policy is not 
worthy of exception under Article XX, the complainant must show that a less trade-restrictive 
policy option is available and effective, or possibly even that the policy does not contribute 
toward achieving a reasonable climate goal at all.  
Even if some measures would be considered illegal under WTO law, Sampson (1998) 
notes that future climate agreements can still provide for them without problem as long as Parties 
to the Agreement voluntarily agree to forgo their WTO rights. Still, this former Director of the 
Trade and Environment Division of the WTO calls for revisiting key WTO provisions for 
clarification. 
Economic Analysis of Border Adjustment 
Economic analysis of border adjustment policies is rooted in the effects of climate policy 
on “competitiveness,” a broad term that can encompass changes in trade flows, terms of trade, 
carbon leakage, and domestic economic indicators like employment or production. Reinaud 
(2005), in a review of the potential competitiveness impacts of the E.U. ETS on energy-intensive 
industries, defines competitiveness for her purposes as “the firm’s ability to maintain and/or 
expand market position based on its cost structure” (17). We will similarly focus on changes in 
production in this study. However, Aldy and Pizer (forthcoming) find that only a portion of the Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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production loss is due to changes in international competitiveness; the majority of the production 
response to energy price increases reflects reduced consumption. 
Studies of the first phase of the E.U. ETS have found little evidence of significant effects 
on competitiveness (Reinaud 2008); however, emissions prices were quite low in the first phase, 
and competitiveness impacts and leakage could loom larger as the cap is tightened. Looking 
toward future phases, Grubb and Neuhoff (2006) raise three options to address competitiveness 
issues and protect the security of low-carbon investments. The first is to negotiate international 
agreements for all major competitors to engage in similar carbon-reducing efforts in their mobile, 
energy-intensive sectors. Second, in the absence of such agreements, they propose the use of 
border tax adjustments. The third option is to employ output-indexed allocation of emissions 
allowances.  
Each of these options has been explored individually by economists, many of whom use 
similar multicountry, multisector static general equilibrium models based on GTAP-E. For 
example, Babiker and Rutherford (2005) compare a reference case of Kyoto-style emissions 
targets without border adjustment to adjustment measures including import tariffs, export 
rebates, exemption of energy-intensive industries, and voluntary export restraints on the part of 
noncoalition countries. They focus on the impacts by country (rather than by sector) and find that 
the exemptions produce the least leakage overall but are associated with higher carbon prices, 
while from a welfare perspective, most countries prefer tariffs. Peterson and Schleich (2007) 
investigate border tax adjustment options for the E.U. ETS, concentrating on the calculation of 
the carbon content for imports, which affects the stringency of the border tax. Fischer and Fox 
(2007) investigate designs for domestic rebate programs, combining output-based allocation of 
emissions permits (revenues) with an emissions pricing program. Their model also considers 
interactions with labor tax distortions, and they show that output-based rebating (designed 
appropriately) can generate lower leakage and higher welfare than grandfathering and even than 
auctioning in some circumstances. 
Other papers have analyzed leakage in specific sectors. In the cement industry, Ponssard 
and Walker (2008) find that the E.U. ETS is likely to induce a high level of carbon leakage 
through increased imports and production relocation. Demailly and Quirion (2006) use a detailed 
spatial model of the cement industry to compare two combinations of a CO2 tax with border 
adjustment. In the first case, the border adjustment is based on actual emissions intensities, both 
for export rebates and for import taxes. In the second scenario, the border adjustment 
corresponds to the BAT, with rebates given according to the least CO2-intensive technology 
available at a large scale, and imports are taxed to the same level. They find that carbon leakage 
decreases in both cases, and foreign emissions even decrease in the first case. However, border Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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adjustment also causes the cement price in the regulated countries to increase, further impacting 
their cement consumers. Demailly and Quirion (2008a) perform some similar analysis for the 
iron and steel industry and include updating allocation options; they find little competitiveness 
effect from the E.U. ETS. Demailly and Quirion (2008b) compare border adjustments and 
allocation options for cement, steel, and aluminum in the European Union. Gielen and Moriguchi 
(2002) simulate the effects of carbon pricing on the Japanese iron and steel industry, finding 
leakage rates of 70 percent and calculating the import tariffs needed to balance that. Ho et al. 
(2008) analyze the competitiveness effects of a $10/ton CO2 price in the United States and find 
considerable leakage in some sectors. 
While economic modelers have addressed particular trade-related and allocation-related 
options for addressing leakage individually or for specific sectors, no one has compared them 
comprehensively. The goal of this paper is to do this in an intuitive and transparent fashion. The 
next section introduces a simple analytical model to illustrate the incentive effects of the 
different policies. The subsequent section parameterizes that model for the key sectors likely to 
be covered by a carbon policy. Results are presented for the United States and Canada, with 
some sensitivity analysis using alternate scenarios, followed by discussion, caveats, and 
directions for further research. 
Model  
The basic issues of international emissions leakage within a given sector can be 
addressed parsimoniously with a two-country, two-good, partial equilibrium model. Since we are 
ultimately taking a sector-specific focus rather than an economy-wide perspective, we do not 
require a general equilibrium, although these aspects will be discussed in the numerical section. 
While general equilibrium effects have significant implications for the climate policy itself, they 
have smaller effects regarding most adjustment measures. 
Consider two countries, Home and Foreign. Home produces good H at a per-unit cost 
() H H cr that rises with reductions  H r  from its baseline emissions rate 
0
H e . For notational 
simplicity, let 
0 (0) HH cc = . Foreign produces good F at a per-unit cost  F c , which does not depend 
on its emission rate, since it does not have an incentive to reduce emissions. Producers are 
perfectly competitive. Global emissions are 
0 () HH F Eer H e F =− + . 
Each country has a representative consumer that demands some of each good. Let home 
and foreign consumption of good H be h and x (exports), respectively, and let home and foreign 
consumption of good F be m (imports) and f¸ respectively. Consumer demand for each good is a 
simple function of the prices of both competing goods in the country of Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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consumption: ( , ) HM hp p ,( , ) HM mp p , ( , ) XF x pp, and ( , ) XF f pp. Those prices in turn will equal 
the (constant) marginal costs of production, inclusive of any taxes or rebates. The resulting 
demand will determine production and, along with the emissions intensities, total emissions. 
Figure 1 illustrates this stylized model. 
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Leakage is conventionally defined as the change in foreign emissions as a share of the 
change in domestic emissions induced by the policy. From a policy effectiveness point of view, 
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 (2) 
Within this framework, we next evaluate some proposed border adjustment policies for 
their ability to enhance the global effectiveness of a domestic emissions pricing policy. We also 
assess the extent to which the policy options temper reductions in domestic production, as an 
indicator both of the competitiveness concerns and of pressures for protection.  
Policy Options 
In the absence of any climate policy, prices are simply the marginal production costs 
without reductions:
0
H XH p pc == , and FM F p pc = = . First, to see the effects of the climate 
policy alone, we impose an emissions price t. Next, to compare different policies for controlling 
emissions leakage, we start from a reference scenario of this domestic emissions pricing 
program: all of the adjustment scenarios will retain that price and the corresponding reduction in 
emissions intensity in home production. Furthermore, since we are evaluating the imposition of 
the full policies, rather than a marginal increase in the rate, we assume  H H dr r = . 
Emissions Price Alone 
In principle, an emissions price can be implemented either by a tax or a cap-and-trade 
program. For our purposes, let us model the policy as a carbon tax (“Ctax”), to operate with a 
consistent price across scenarios. The implicit assumption is that changes in a given sector do not 
affect the emissions price; this situation would also occur in an emissions cap framework if the Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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sector is fairly small, if international or intertemporal linking occur, or if a safety valve (price 
ceiling) is binding. 
With an emissions price t in the home country and no adjustment mechanisms, 
0 () ( ) H XH H H H p pc rt er == + − and FM F p pc = = . In other words, domestically produced goods 
see their prices rise not only due to changes in their production costs, but also due to the 
additional emissions payments associated with each unit of output. Prices of foreign-produced 
goods remain unchanged. 
Substituting these prices and changes into (2) and simplifying, we see the change in 
global emissions is 




HH h H x X F m H f X
H
cct e




=− + + + + . 
where 
0 () H HH ee r =− is shorthand for the home emissions rate in the presence of the emissions 
price. The first effect of the emissions price is to reduce the emissions rate for all home 
production; the second effect is to raise the price of the home good, which causes substitution 
effects across all goods, with corresponding emissions changes.  














Border Adjustment for Imports 
This policy attempts to level the playing field between the home good and imports for 
domestic consumption by ensuring that imports are equally penalized for the emissions 
associated with their production. Let this import tax policy be denoted by the subscript 
“ImpTax.” It combines an emissions price in the home country with a tax on the emissions 
“embodied” in imports of the foreign good into the home country. Since the definition of 
embodied emissions is also a policy choice, we denote the defined emissions intensity as  ˆF e . 
Consequently, the price impacts of this policy are ( ) ( ) H XH H H H p pc rt er = =+ − ,  ˆ M FF p ct e =+, 
and FF p c = . In the base case,  ˆFF ee = , the actual emissions intensity. However, many of the 
proposed border adjustment policies that are thought to be WTO compatible involve a smaller 
border tax. Some propose using home emissions intensity ( ˆFH ee = ), or BATs. The Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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Bingaman/Specter proposal only imposes the tax on embodied emissions above some baseline 
(essentially, 
0 ˆFFF eee =−). 
Simplifying the changes in global emissions, we get 
  () () () ()
0
ImpTax 0 0
ˆ HH H F
H H hH xX F mH fX H hM F mM
H F
c c te te
dE r H e h x e m f e h e m
cc
ηη η η η η
−+
=− + + + + + +  
Thus, we have the same direct effects of the emissions price, plus an additional effect on 
home and import consumption due to the increased price of imports. 
The change in domestic production is then 
  () ()
0
ImpTax 00
ˆ HH H F
hH xX hM
HF
cct e t e




=+ + . 
Border Rebate for Exports 
Contrary to the border tax on imports, offering a border rebate for exports attempts to 
level the playing field abroad. This export rebate policy (“ExpReb”) rebates the value of the 
emissions embodied in exports, so that they do not face a competitive disadvantage in foreign 
markets, but maintains the full emissions pricing at home:  ( ) ( ) H HH H H p cr t e r = +− , 
() XH H p cr = , and  FM F p pc == . 
Simplifying the change in emissions, we get 




HH h H F m H H x X F f X
HH
cct e cc




=− + + + +  
Thus, the price change for exports, and the corresponding impacts on emissions from 
exports and foreign good consumption, are smaller than with the emissions tax alone. 
The change in domestic production is then 












Full Border Adjustment 
Full border adjustment combines the previous two policies, forgiving the value of the 
emissions embodied in exports and taxing the emissions embodied in imports. This adjustment 
essentially turns the emissions price into a destination-based tax, much like most revenue-raising Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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consumption taxes. The corresponding price changes are  ( ) ( ) H HH H H p cr t e r = +− , ( ) XH H p cr = , 
ˆ M FF p ct e =+, and  FF p c = . 
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These effects are also a combination of those from the border tax and rebate policies, 
which is also evident when we simplify the effects on domestic production. 
  () () ()
00
FullBTA 00
ˆ HH H HH F
hH xX hM
HH F
cct e cc t e




=+ +  
Home Rebate 
The home rebate (“HomeReb”) directs the full value of the emission rents to be rebated 
to producers of the home good, whether for domestic consumption or exports. In other words, 
while the emissions price induces reductions in the emissions rate, the tax is not imposed on the 
emissions embodied in an additional unit of output: ( ) H XH H p pc r = =  and  FM F p pc == . 
This policy mimics an intensity-based regulation, and can be implemented that way, or 
by output-based rebating of emissions payments (as in the Swedish NOx tax-rebate program), or 
by rate-based allocation of emissions permits in a cap-and-trade policy (see Fischer 2001; 
Fischer and Fox, 2007). Because it does not tax embodied emissions, this policy is only effective 
to the extent opportunities exist to reduce emissions in production processes, as opposed to 
reducing consumption of the good. 





HH h H x X F m H f X
H
cc




=− + + + +  
Thus, the full rebate mitigates the substitution impacts induced by the increase in the 
price of the domestically produced good. Like all the policies, it retains the direct effect of 
emissions rate reductions induced by the emissions price. 














Costs Not Adjusted 
Notice that none of the policies address the cost increases due to changes in production 
methods to reduce emissions (
0
H H cc − ); rather, they only impose or remove the carbon tax costs 
of the remaining emissions associated with production. Thus, the adjustment policies defined 
here will only offset a large portion of the competitiveness change if these tax costs are large 
relative to the costs of fuel switching and improving energy efficiency. The other costs ignored 
in this partial equilibrium framework are upstream cost increases, such as electricity price rises 
(a particular concern for aluminum, for example). Some proposals would include adjustment for 
these cost changes as well as emissions payment requirements; none to date would address the 
costs of changing production techniques. 
Comparing Anti-Leakage Policies  
How do these policies compare in terms of reducing competitiveness impacts and 
ensuring more genuine emissions reductions globally? All the policies either raise the cost of 
foreign-sourced goods or lower the cost of home-produced goods. As a result, all adjustment 
policies raise domestic output relative to the tax alone (assuming the substitution elasticities are 
well behaved); they also raise domestic emissions. Furthermore, they all reduce foreign output 
relative to the tax alone, and thereby reduce foreign emissions. Consequently, they do not 
necessarily reduce global emissions, since displaced foreign emissions are to some extent 
replaced by domestic emissions. Nor do they necessarily reduce leakage, as conventionally 
defined, since they both decrease the numerator of foreign increases and denominator of 
domestic reductions. Nor is it possible to rank order the options. In each case, the effectiveness 
depends on the relative elasticities of substitution, size, and emissions rates. Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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Table 1. Comparison of Effects of Adjustment Policies on Competitiveness 
 
  Additional Domestic Production 
Relative to Tax Alone 
Import tax  ( )
0 ˆ / FFh M te c h η  
Export rebate  ( )( )
0 / HH x X te c x η −  
Full border adjustment   ( )( ) ( )
0 ˆ // HH x X FFh M te c x te c h ηη −+  
Home rebate  ( )( )
0 / HH h H x X te c h x ηη −−  
 
First, compare the effects on domestic production, our measure of competitiveness 
( Ctax i dH dH − , for each policy i), as summarized in Table 1. Since the border tax and the border 
rebate each raise domestic production, the full border adjustment dominates either of its single 
components. However, it does not necessarily dominate the home rebate: 









−= − − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
. Both policies mitigate the cost increase for 
exports, so which policy induces more home production depends on the relative cost changes for 
imported and domestic goods and whether home good consumption is more sensitive to home or 
import price changes. 
The impacts of adjustment policies on global emissions are less obvious. A policy i will 
provide additional global emissions reductions if its changes in emissions are smaller (more 
negative) than those induced by the emissions price alone; that is, if  Ctax 0 i dE dE −> . Table 2 
presents these additional emissions reductions for each of our policy options, and it makes 
apparent that none of these policies necessarily reduces leakage.  
 Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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Table 2. Comparison of Effects of Adjustment Policies on Global Emissions 
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The border tax on imports reduces emissions relative to the tax if the displaced emissions 
from fewer imports exceeds the increased emissions from more domestic consumption (i.e., if 
mM F hM H em eh ηη −>). This result is more likely, the larger the elasticity of demand for imports, 
foreign emission rate, and import volume relative to the domestic emissions rate, home 
consumption, and the elasticity of home demand with respect to the import price. 
The export rebate reduces emissions relative to the tax if the displaced emissions from 
less foreign consumption exceeds the increased emissions from the additional exports (if 
fX F xX H ef ex ηη >− ). This result is more likely, the greater is the substitutability between exports 
and the foreign good, the larger are the foreign good emissions, and the more inelastically 
demanded are exports. The export rebate may or may not be more effective than the import tax, 
depending if the net emissions displaced by the additional exports in the rebate case exceed the 
net emissions reductions from fewer imports with the import tax. 
The full border adjustment policy combines the preceding two policies. If each of these 
policies is effective on its own, then the combination will result in fewer global emissions than 
either an import tax or export rebate alone. If only one of these policies is effective, then that 
policy dominates full border adjustment, which in turn dominates the ineffective policy. 
The home rebate is effective in its own right if the displaced foreign emissions exceed the 
additional home emissions. The home rebate also provides more reductions than the export Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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rebate alone if the displaced emissions from fewer imports exceeds the increased emissions from 
more domestic consumption (if  mH F hH H em eh ηη >− ). Note that this condition differs from that for 
the import tax being effective, since the different relevant elasticities are those with respect to the 
home good price rather than the import price. This result is more likely, the more sensitive are 
imports to the home good price, the larger are emissions from imports, and the less price-
sensitive is the home good. Since both policies affect the export market similarly, full border 
adjustment is more effective than the home rebate if the change in emissions from different 
import levels outweighs the change in emissions from different home good consumption.  
Overall, however, little can be said definitively without understanding the relative 
magnitude of the elasticities, emissions rates, and consumption volumes. Any of these policies 
could potentially dominate. Furthermore, it may be that none of the adjustment policies is 
warranted from a global perspective, such as if demand for foreign-produced goods is highly 
inelastic (i.e.,  ,, mH mM fX η ηη  all close to zero).  
In the next section, we illustrate the results by parameterizing this model with estimates 
from different sectors that are likely to be regulated for GHG emissions. We also select two 
countries (the United States and Canada) with very different profiles in terms of trade 
sensitivities and emissions intensities for these sectors. 
Simulations 
Fischer and Fox (2008) use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of global 
trade (based on GTAP-EG in GAMS) to simulate the effects of a $50/ton C emissions price 
implemented unilaterally in the United States and applied to certain emissions-intensive sectors. 
We utilize these and additional simulations from this complex model to parameterize the 
analytical model that makes the trade-offs among border adjustment policies more transparent.  
Specifically, for the parameterized model, we assume simple functional forms with 











η η ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎜⎟ Δ= − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
, where Qi0 is baseline production, pi and  ii η  are its own price and 
elasticity, while pi and  ii η  are the relevant cross price and elasticity. We focus here on the 
covered sectors separately: electricity (ELE); refined petroleum products (OIL); chemicals 
(CRP); nonmetallic minerals (NMM), which includes some ceramic production; pulp, paper, and 
print (PPP); and iron and steel (I_S). The cost of these simplifications is that we ignore cross-
price and income effects that influence energy demands in other sectors, as well as terms-of-Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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trade effects. However, we calibrate these parameters by using the results from the CGE model 
as in Fischer and Fox (2007, 2008). An advantage of these simplifications is that, unlike in the 
complex CGE model, we can easily perform sensitivity analysis. 
From the $50/ton C experiment, we derive the emissions, prices, and quantities in 
response to the carbon price, including the predicted leakage and production changes, in the 
absence of any adjustment policies.1 To calculate marginal changes from this new baseline, we 
then add a small production tax in the covered sectors that raises the prices of h and x by 0.01 
percent, which allows us to estimate the elasticities  , , , hH mH xX fX η ηηη  as well as the emissions 
intensities of the changes in foreign production. In this manner, we control for the larger effects 
of the emissions pricing on the average responses and focus on the marginal responses 
attributable to production cost changes, which is the mechanism of the adjustment policies. The 
parameters , mM hM η η  were estimated from the same model by imposing increases in the tariff, 
also on a sector-by-sector basis, of 0.1 percent. Since the foreign good price does not change in 
our simulations, the elasticities  , fFx F η η  do not come into play.2  (All relevant elasticities are 
reported in the Appendix). 
Most studies of leakage focus on average leakage, conventionally defined as the change 
in the foreign sector’s emissions as a share of the reduction in the domestic sector’s emissions. 
We distinguish between this average leakage, which reflects the relative changes in emissions 
induced by the overall carbon price, and marginal leakage—that is, the change in the foreign 
sector’s emissions as that are induced by production price changes in that sector. These are the 
effects relevant for the adjustment policies, and the distinction turns out to be an important one.  
Much of the increase in foreign emissions arises due to the general equilibrium effects of 
the emissions price, which not only changes the relative prices of manufactured goods, but also 
drives down fossil fuel prices globally, due to the large-scale withdrawal of demand from the 
United States. For example, foreign OIL sector prices fall about 0.5 percent (while domestic 
prices rise 4.3 percent), and similar declines in other fossil fuel prices lead to a small drop in 
foreign electricity prices, and in turn increase fuel use, carbon intensities, and emissions abroad. 
                                                 
1 This scenario includes revenue recycling, but in terms of leakage and the changes induced by border adjustments 
and rebate policies, the results are quite similar to those with emissions permit grandfathering. 
2 Even for a large economy like the United States, foreign price changes are not significant for the covered energy-
intensive sectors, with the exception of petroleum products and electricity; still, the equilibrium quantity reactions 
are implicit in our parameterization.  Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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Table 3 shows that average leakage rates in the modeled scenario range from 64% for OIL and 
60% for steel to 8% for electricity, a high rate for a sector with negligible trade (Table 4). 
Average leakage is thus highly sensitive to the parameterization of fossil fuel supply curves 
(Burniaux and Martins 1999). However, energy price–driven leakage is less important for 
comparing anti-leakage policies. Unlike the carbon price, border adjustments and rebates based 
on production do little to change relative fuel prices. Thus, these energy price changes remain in 
the background and are to a large extent unavoidable.  
Marginal leakage rates from production shifting can actually be quite high—indeed, they 
determine whether an adjustment policy is environmentally effective. However, in scope, relative 
to total reductions, the leakage attributable to shifts in production turn out to be a small part of 
the average leakage rate, as the production changes are relatively small (Table 3). 
Table 3. Measures of Competitiveness and Carbon Leakage for the U.S.  
  ELE OIL CRP  NMM  PPP I_S
Baseline production change, % from no policy  -6.1% -4.4% -1.1%  -0.9% -0.3% -0.6%
Baseline leakage, 1000 MtC  10153 5969 801  791 138 489
Baseline leakage rate, % of sector reductions  8% 64% 20%  39% 11% 60%
Leakage due to production changes, % of sector reductions 3% 57% 6%  14% 2% 14%
 
Table 4 reports many of the factors that indicate the scope for leakage from the United 
States. In the baseline (2001, for the GTAP model), the export intensities of production and 
import intensities of consumption range from nearly zero percent for electricity to 15 percent in 
some sectors. The relative emissions intensity is the emissions intensity of (marginal) foreign 
production as a percentage of the average emissions intensity of domestic production. For 
chemicals and pulp and paper, foreign intensities are quite similar to domestic ones, but they are 
lower for electricity and higher for the other sectors. 
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Table 4. Trade Shares and Relative Emissions Intensities for the United States 
ELE OIL CRP  NMM  PPP  I_S 
Baseline export share of home production   0%  5%  13%  11%  5%  5% 
Baseline import share of home consumption  1%  11%  14%  15%  6%  11% 
Foreign emissions intensity relative to U.S.  98%  143% 118% 215%  168%  295%
Emissions payments as % of cost increase  103% 101% 46%  78%  59%  46% 
 
The contraction in production that accompanies the carbon price is, in the baseline, 
roughly 1 percent or less for energy-intensive manufacturing in the United States (Table 3). The 
left side of Figure 2 reports the effectiveness of the different anti-leakage policies on stemming 
the loss in production. For most sectors, the home rebate is the most effective single policy. Iron 
and steel production and nonmetallic minerals benefit strongly from the import tax, at least when 
imports are taxed according to the foreign emissions intensity. Full border adjustment, the sum of 
the import tax and export rebate, is the most effective policy for these sectors when foreign 
embodied emissions are fully taxed.  
Figure 2. Results of Adjustment Policies for the United States 
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The right side of Figure 2 depicts the additional net reductions achieved relative to the 
emissions tax policy alone as a percentage of the domestic reductions under that scenario. We 
find that, with the exception of petroleum products, the policies achieve less than an 8 percent 
improvement in net emissions reductions. Full border adjustment (at the foreign emissions 
intensity) is most effective, but only weakly so for several sectors. Since foreign emissions rates 
are higher in all sectors but electricity, any weakening of the import adjustment by using 
domestic or BAT emissions intensities to calculate the adjustment produces smaller results. 
When the import adjustment is restricted to the comparable domestic tax, the home rebate is 
more effective for steel and of comparable effectiveness for the other energy-intensive 
manufacturing sectors. However, the home rebate actually increases global emissions when 
applied to electricity and petroleum products, as the domestic expansion (from lower home 
energy prices) exceeds any foreign reduction.  
We conduct the same analysis for Canada, which exhibits a different economic structure. 
Larger shares of Canadian goods are traded (Table 5), but as a smaller country, the foreign 
response is smaller (see elasticity tables in the Appendix). Furthermore, the emissions intensities 
of displaced foreign goods are closer to parity and occasionally lower than domestic intensities 
(Table 5).  
Table 5. Trade Shares and Relative Emissions Intensities for Canada 
ELE OIL CRP NMM  PPP  I_S 
Export share of home production   5%  15% 46%  33%  44%  21% 
Import share of home consumption  3%  9%  51%  42%  22%  26% 
Emissions rate ratio (foreign to domestic)  216% 89% 115% 107%  80%  115%
Emissions payments as % of cost increase 92%  89% 48%  78%  49%  58% 
 
The results of the border adjustment policies are displayed in Figure 3. For Canada, there 
is little difference between the border tax adjustment for imports based on domestic or foreign 
emissions intensities. None of the policies really improve net reductions in nonmetallic minerals 
and pulp and paper. For the other sectors, full border adjustment is most effective, improving net 
reductions by 4–10 percent. Of the single policies, the export rebate most often delivers the 
greatest net reductions, in large contrast to the U.S. case, where the import tax was more 
effective. While the home rebate is across the board the most effective at avoiding lost 
production, and reasonably effective at avoiding leakage in the manufacturing sectors, it is Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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utterly ineffective at improving net reductions and quite counterproductive for electricity and 
especially refined petroleum products.  
Figure 3. Results of Adjustment Policies for Canada 
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The limitations of these policies are also revealed when looking at average leakage rates 
(Figure 4). While they decrease the foreign emissions in the numerator, they also decrease the 
domestic reductions in the denominator. In some cases, (like OIL), the latter effect dominates 
and average leakage actually increases. Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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Figure 4. Effects of Adjustment Policies on Average Leakage Rates 
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Some stakeholders argue for rebates that account for not only emissions allowance costs 
but also upstream cost changes. If one uses the full cost change under the carbon price as the 
basis for adjustments and rebates, the policies unsurprisingly have stronger effects, and net 
reductions double for the steel sector. Still, the net improvements in emissions remain modest as 
a share of baseline domestic reductions, being limited to the leakage that is attributed to 
production shifting (last line of Table 3).  
Discussion and Caveats 
This analysis has several important caveats and areas for future research. First, and 
perhaps most importantly, our level of aggregation for the sectors—chosen because of the 
availability of econometrically estimated trade elasticities—is arguably too high. The relative 
emissions intensities of foreign goods and elasticities may be quite different for more narrowly 
defined subsectors. Since elasticities of substitution typically rise with greater disaggregation, it 
is possible that the small numbers for the aggregate leakage that can be avoided mask larger 
effects for particular energy-intensive and trade-sensitive subsectors. Thus, improving estimates Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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of these parameters for the specific industries being targeted by climate policies is of great 
importance for understanding the potential benefits of engaging in border adjustment or rebate 
policies. 
Second, by modeling a carbon tax, this analysis assumes the domestic emissions price 
remains fixed. With a cap-and-trade system (at home or abroad), any policy that would otherwise 
raise emissions instead drives up the allowance price; while overall emissions may not rise in the 
covered sectors, costs will rise, and their distribution across sectors can change. Since all of these 
policies tend to raise domestic emissions, the extent they do so under a carbon tax is an indicator 
of the size of distortions they would create in the domestic emissions market.  
The analysis also ignores climate policies in other countries, including the E.U. ETS. The 
impact of this unilateralist assumption depends on the sector and country. For example, in our 
model, 14 percent of the leakage related to production shifting for the U.S. steel sector goes to 
Europe, and roughly one-third to Annex I nations (and 17 percent to China).3 For Canada, 72 
percent of the displaced emissions go to the United States, while 3 percent go to Europe. Since 
border adjustments can in theory be designed to distinguish between countries with and without 
adequate climate policies, while the home rebate cannot, the policies will have different trade-
offs as more countries undertake significant and costly GHG reduction policies. 
Finally, policy makers and industry stakeholders have a tendency to worry about 
competitiveness and leakage on a sector-by-sector basis. We have parameterized a model in that 
same vein, revealing some important trade-offs among the first-order effects of border 
adjustment and rebate policies. However, sectors do not operate in a vacuum, and any policy 
targeting one sector will have secondary effects on other sectors that it buys from and sells to, 
and so on. Ultimately, from an effectiveness standpoint, one cares about total global emissions 
from all sectors—both covered and uncovered, and at home and abroad. A better understanding 
of these general equilibrium effects is an area for future research, but we also conduct an initial 
evaluation here. We simulated the policy of the full border adjustment by using the home 
emission rates in the full CGE model and compared the results to those of our parameterized 
partial equilibrium model for the United States. Unsurprisingly, we found important general 
                                                 
3 These leakage shares do differ from simple import shares, since they include export-related effects and differences 
in emissions rates; for example, Houser et al. (2008, Table 3.1) report that over half of steel imports are from Annex 
I nations, so this import share metric may understate leakage.  Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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equilibrium effects when ELE and OIL were included in the border adjustment policy. Excluding 
these sectors, the partial equilibrium model did a good job of representing the effects on the 
sectors receiving the adjustment, although with a slight tendency to overstate the effects, 
particularly for I_S. Overall, however, by ignoring effects on other sectors, it understates the 
equilibrium effect of the border adjustment policy on total emissions at home by half and on 
foreign emissions reductions by a quarter, the net result being an overstatement of net global 
reductions that can be achieved by the policy, which were already quite small.  
Conclusion  
Our analysis indicates that border adjustments for climate policy are not only likely to be 
contentious and disputed under trade law, but may not even be very effective at improving 
overall emissions reductions net of foreign leakage. A border tax on imports only affects the 
relative price of domestic and foreign goods in the home country. Policies that provide export 
relief, on the other hand, affect the relative price of the home good in the rest of the world and 
discourage substitution abroad, but not at home. Rebates at home discourage substitution toward 
foreign goods at home and abroad, but they also discourage conservation at home. All policies 
do, however, avoid some of the losses in production associated with a carbon tax. 
While it seems that full border adjustment would likely be the most effective policy for 
the United States for avoiding leakage, if this option is not judged to be consistent with trade law 
or practically feasible, then the home rebate could achieve most of those gains. The exceptions 
are in the electricity and refined oil products sectors, where the subsidy undoes the incentives to 
curb domestic consumption and thus expands emissions at home considerably. However, since 
the home rebate does not discriminate among competing countries, a mechanism may be 
required for phasing out these domestic benefits as more of the important trading partners take 
on comparable climate policies. 
Finally, we acknowledge some important practical considerations. For import 
adjustments, any version that attempts to discriminate by country raises thorny issues of how to 
calculate embodied emissions for foreign products and how to define and enforce reliable rules 
of origin. For rebates, policymakers do need to be careful not to undo the incentive effects of the 
emissions price. Any export relief or rebate should be based on sector-wide measures of 
emissions intensity, rather than actual firm-level emissions, to ensure that the subsidy supports 
output and not emissions. However, average intensity metrics face the challenge of defining the 
denominator—the unit of production. The same sector (and even firm) can produce different 
kinds of products. Defining and implementing these kinds of rebates is akin to setting and Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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enforcing emissions performance standards by product. Such efforts are certainly being 
considered, particularly in the context of potential sectoral agreements, but the devil will be in 
the details. Resources for the Future            Fischer and Fox 
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Table 6. Simulated Elasticities for the United States 
Sector  hH η   mH η xX η   fX η   mM η   hM η  
Electricity  (0.56) 2.29 (4.34) 0.00 (2.76) 0.02 
Petroleum and coal products (refined)  (0.86) 1.27 (3.30) 0.04 (1.84) 0.17 
Chemical industry    2.34  (4.58) 0.29 (2.51)  0.46 
Nonmetallic minerals  (0.60) 2.36 (4.22) 0.10 (2.27) 0.46 
Paper, pulp, and print  (0.59) 2.86 (4.07) 0.13 (2.62) 0.20 
Iron and steel industry  (0.51) 2.79 (4.49) 0.06 (2.50) 0.35 
 
 
Table 7. Simulated Elasticities for Canada 
Sector  hH η   mH η   xX η   fX η   mM η   hM η
Electricity  (0.71) 2.17 (3.62) 0.00 (2.73) 0.06 
Petroleum and coal products (refined)  (1.07) 1.28 (3.71) 0.01 (1.88) 0.15 
Chemical industry   (3.16) 0.37 (5.48) 0.05 (1.34) 1.32 
Nonmetallic minerals  (1.58) 1.43 (5.01) 0.02 (1.54) 1.20 
Paper, pulp, and print  (1.46) 1.67 (3.95) 0.08 (2.16) 0.64 
Iron and steel industry  (1.45) 1.93 (5.08) 0.03 (1.97) 0.78 
 
 
  